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SUMMARY 
Located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Test Cell A (TCA) Facility was used in the 
early to mid-1960s for the testing of nuclear rocket engines, as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development 
Program, to further space travel. Nuclear rocket testing resulted in the activation of materials around the 
reactors and the release of fission products and fuel particles in the immediate area.  
 
Identified as Corrective Action Unit 115, the TCA facility was decontaminated and decommissioned 
(D&D) from December 2004 to July 2005 using the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration 
(SAFER) process, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The SAFER process allows 
environmental remediation and facility closure activities (i.e., decommissioning) to occur simultaneously 
provided technical decisions are made by an experienced decision maker within the site conceptual site 
model, identified in the Data Quality Objective process. Facility closure involved a seven-step 
decommissioning strategy.  
 
First, preliminary investigation activities were performed, including review of process knowledge 
documentation, targeted facility radiological and hazardous material surveys and verification, concrete core 
drilling and analysis (used to plan controlled explosive demolition of the shield wall and air dispersion 
calculations), shield wall radiological characterization using the In-Situ Object Counting System, and 
discrete sampling. Selected characterization activities, performed early in the project, proved to be very 
useful in subsequent decommissioning planning and execution, and worker safety. Second, site setup and 
mobilization of equipment and personnel were completed.  
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Third, removal of hazardous materials, including asbestos, lead, cadmium, and oil, was performed 
early in the project. Asbestos insulation wrapped the exterior-run conduit as a heat shield. The asbestos-
containing materials were also wrapped in a silver foil, which contained levels of cadmium that exceeded 
allowable sanitary landfill disposal requirements that remained on the asbestos after removal. Lead bricks 
were removed from the shield wall. Oil was drained and process piping verified it was void of contents. 
Electrical systems were de-energized and other systems were rendered free of residual energy. Early 
removal of hazardous materials ensured worker safety during more evasive demolition activities. 
 
Fourth, areas of high radiological contamination, such as the concrete pad and roof, contaminated 
during testing and operation of the nuclear rockets, were decontaminated using multiple methods, followed 
by soil removal. Contamination levels varied across the facility. Fixed beta/gamma contamination levels 
ranged up to 2 million disintegrations per minute (dpm)/100 centimeters squared (cm2) beta/gamma.  
Removable beta/gamma contamination levels seldom exceeded 1,000 dpm/100 cm2, but in railroad 
trenches on the reactor pad containing soil on the concrete pad in front of the shield wall the beta dose rates 
ranged up to 120 milli-radians per hour from radioactivity entrained in the soil. General area dose rates 
were less than 100 micro-roentgens per hour. The higher levels of contamination and radiation were 
generally confined to the reactor pad, concrete shield wall, and on some stainless steel piping. Prior to 
demolition of the reactor shield wall, removable and fixed contaminated surfaces were decontaminated to 
the best extent possible. Various decontamination techniques were used, including masslin wiping, 
debris/material removal, pressure washing, scabbling, and high-efficiency particular air vacuuming, which 
minimized the suspension of contamination into the atmosphere during mechanical and explosive 
demolition. 
 
Fifth, large sections of the remaining structures were demolished by mechanical and open-air 
controlled explosive demolition (CED). Mechanical demolition methods included the use of conventional 
demolition equipment (hydraulic hammer and processors) for removal of three main buildings, an exhaust 
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stack, and a mobile shed. The 5-foot (ft), 5-inch (in) thick, neutron-activated reinforced concrete shield was 
demolished by CED, which had never been performed at the NTS.   
 
A 100,000-gallon steel, liquid-hydrogen cryogenic tank (i.e., dewar) was also systematically 
demolished during the project. The demolition of this structure proved difficult, as the dewar contained a 3-
foot void space between two steel shells, which contained perlite insulation. The perlite had been impacted 
by moisture, and had partially solidified over time. With a consistency and similar properties to talcum 
powder, the perlite was vacuumed from small holes cut into the outer shell. The remaining structure was 
size-reduced using burn rods and hydraulic shears. 
 
The shield wall has contaminated with significant levels of 60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, and 155Eu.  Concrete core 
sample analysis showed induced radioactivity to a depth of 20-in. The highest level of activated concrete 
was at the center point of the exposed surface of the shield wall in front of where the reactors were 
operated. Radioactivity levels diminished laterally and horizontally with distance from that point. The 
major radiological hazard in CED was the release of airborne dust with high levels of radioactivity.  
 
Conventional explosives (i.e., C-4) were loaded into over 400 pre-drilled holes, to a minimum depth of 
36-in approximately 2 ½ ft apart, so the explosives generating the fine dust were pulverizing clean concrete 
instead of radiologically-impacted concrete on the outer 20 in. Sticky pads were placed radially around the 
shield wall in the direction of the prevailing winds, which allowed for direct analysis of radiological dust 
dispersion, immediately following the blast. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency CAP-88C program 
(i.e., Gaussian plume model) was used for atmospheric dispersion modeling to determine the bounding 
airborne radioactivity concentrations that could be expected from CED. The CED was closely monitored 
and resulted in no radiological exposure or atmospheric release; resulting radiological analysis of the sticky 
pads revealed levels less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm2 for all sticky pads.   
 
The holes were drilled in the shield wall, and explosives loaded. Then the wall was covered with a 
layer of geotextile material, secured via draping and tying chain-link fence to the wall. The cover was 
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intended to minimize the velocity of ejected materials, control the area where the materials would spread, 
and minimize dust to some extent. Successful CED of the shield wall performed by world-renown experts, 
Controlled Demolition Inc., demonstrated that this technique is cost efficient, and can contribute to 
accelerated D&D timelines. More importantly, this method increased safety by removing personnel from 
repeated exposure to heights, noise, radiation, and other hazardous working conditions.  
 
Sixth, final radiological release surveys were performed to document the final status and radiological 
conditions of the remaining concrete pads and surrounding soil. Surveys also continued during the seventh 
phase, waste management. Over 1,800 cubic yards of remaining radiologically-impacted building debris 
was containerized into 140 bags and disposed of as low-level waste. 
 
Key lessons learned from the project included: (1) Targeted preliminary investigation activities 
provided a more solid technical approach, reduced surprises and scope creep, and made the working 
environment safer for the D&D worker. (2) Early identification of risks and uncertainties provided 
opportunities for risk management and mitigation planning to address challenges and unanticipated 
conditions. (3) Team reviews provided an excellent mechanism to consider all aspects of the task, 
integrated safety into activity performance, increase team unity and ‘buy-in’ and promoted innovative and 
time saving ideas. (4) Development of CED protocols ensured safety and control. (5) The same proven 
D&D strategy is now being employed on the larger ‘sister’ facility, Test Cell C. 
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